Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8a2fe95f04697a16…

MALICIOUS

PDF

218.5 KB Created: 2012-06-26 19:14:52 +01:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word - 10087.doc (via ScanSoft PDF Create! 6) First seen: 2022-03-20
MD5: e2f31bb1ff962d651c4522c4fa6c789b SHA-1: 6e7c69b56fd1d3fd2f8670e2bb55aae8cc24bf7c SHA-256: 8a2fe95f04697a16a7f7affdbc5fe89231b4c26fb0558406599c34321b3b0da0
546 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF contains JavaScript and a launch action that executes cmd.exe. This command is used to execute an embedded Windows executable payload, which is disguised as a PDF file named '1710087.pdf'. The embedded executable is the primary malicious component, and the PDF acts as a dropper and exploit vector.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 14

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\1710087.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Optional Content Group with action trigger low PDF_OPTIONAL_CONTENT
    Optional Content Group (layer) co-occurs with an action trigger — content can be selectively hidden from viewers or scanners while the action still fires on open
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.monotype.comMonotype In extracted file (stream_004_off00005072.bin)
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_arial.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.htmlIn extracted file (stream_004_off00005072.bin)

Related samples 1

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
1710087.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 103 at offset 0x28A31 112231 bytes
SHA-256: 01af3e2c189130367819d80683f29335a9e946e365cd6d135eec9028603f0a32
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Agent-36272
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=1710087.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file
javascript_obj0104_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 104 at offset 0x3647A 56 bytes
SHA-256: bbbc2f735ddb6bc84cfb19d0a855ff1ca06fdcebfe925fe45a0b8b254e1bac9c
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "1710087", nLaunch: 0 });
stream_004_off00005072.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5072 109820 bytes
SHA-256: b2d3159200c4932774b5b029f03c3ddeeb33d264494e2981f344f84b95641957

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