Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8a0c797277b5335f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.1 KB Created: 2020-10-25 06:40:00 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-12-26
MD5: e82b237a2930351f99704c63c8efd63a SHA-1: 02498bf0410f4a5d762e2221a6a74894bad441d7 SHA-256: 8a0c797277b5335f60feae09bc28db355ec5a54f0f605df325464832c3a0bf13
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/pify?keyword=telecharger+facebook+gratuit+pour+android In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374013/normal_5f89b4fe99556.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374853/normal_5f914e92e2253.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365563/normal_5f94efb5892a1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4372972/normal_5f8d00e289298.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367937/normal_5f8aac80a68ce.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4382408/normal_5f94f2ca6385e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369187/normal_5f89124315436.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4388405/normal_5f91537aa8616.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wesoxiworikezux.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380467/7137201.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zimiduninu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637103/7840343.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nasinapalu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739684/letabumu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mixorone.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438240/pekukipuvi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jovikuveditowe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874612/2914057.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://duxixujojive.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739103/c2e5fb8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://puniduvete.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134341297/gozemu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wunamixexot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134456109/3186825.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006e25.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006e25.bin)
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0498/3147/7403/files/voice_changer_while_gaming_android.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0266/9346/8338/files/ruzagar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9046/9283/files/26114003559.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0483/5298/5251/files/fire_emblem_6_chapters.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006e25.bin)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006e25.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6E25 5392 bytes
SHA-256: 9098e509160d2976a7ea6bb196cab82fd0504ddb618a014f49edfa4c75991514
font_01_sfnt_off0000806e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x806E 11732 bytes
SHA-256: 2a686b79bc275c50b39d3fbce1d484c2304cff9327d26910aea80de028934d02