Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 9fbc2eb2512b0ab5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.1 KB Created: 2020-11-13 08:50:38 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: bf6aa82d625cfcdbb4df0f3479578c68 SHA-1: d76a9747ce767f401d7907242c4d8185a1cbab5d SHA-256: 9fbc2eb2512b0ab5f3df3af9279d87d55a9efa8eb837b82a609080390f91cbcd
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains numerous embedded links, many pointing to disposable hosting services and redirector infrastructure, indicating a link farm designed to distribute malicious content. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware delivery. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs are indicative of malicious redirection.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/strik?utm_term=aas+player+manual
    • https://gozaxuvo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134612917/fab7ec0253.pdf
    • https://rafulosuzeme.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134234553/wawaduxag_sudipurazu_rebavewudokut.pdf
    • https://palifeselaliku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134441248/ralawur.pdf
    • https://nutawazozi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134699679/9426896.pdf
    • https://ganulexotugoris.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164012/9198ced65a71e8.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4425511/normal_5fa5e12f4d84b.pdf
    • https://kuzaloxamuw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406684/potot-kuvexejoxis.pdf
    • https://xataramev.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134320843/tapalisizemef.pdf
    • https://bawidonawasaz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134354070/1533040.pdf
    • https://puniduvete.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134341297/pejexenis.pdf
    • https://folanejo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776558/pewepomasezobejum.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zinudipir/44661206535.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kakekojezutok/43157678596.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pevuwarobuvowa/sas_zombie_assault_td.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f196.bin
7834b932bf0b98a27b62d024c95bbbefaa101d6c986352ca27efe3e167dee651		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF196 5056 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000102b7.bin
1c6f3472e9b7865a0c21ff3bd6de08825fcdbd064c4d403abf6f1101f3671f38		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x102B7 10924 bytes

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