Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 824e8c2ba8299b34…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.3 KB Created: 2020-07-09 17:23:10 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 249012fea91b1f6832ada1855c8ae52d SHA-1: d9fc9343ce6eb56d4defd3cfc1e4042a0c42e3e1 SHA-256: 824e8c2ba8299b3432ad0e8afde2e9e47f603c22a82c7f5b65cdd80f279fd170
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links pointing to various domains, many of which appear to be disposable hosting. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. The document body and embedded links suggest a tactic to drive traffic to potentially malicious or phishing sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=numbers%20in%20written%20form%20pdf
    • http://files.pestcontrolbrampton.org/uploads/1/3/2/7/132712163/570fe3c4c1.pdf
    • http://files.burnetcountyhighlandlakesmastergardener.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438150/da4ccc942.pdf
    • http://files.seattlefirstbaptist.org/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303080/81e42db7c9176.pdf
    • http://files.caaeonline.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379252/tufovovofivozibab.pdf
    • http://files.haleygarrett.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070992/2413854.pdf
    • http://files.coolcaribbeanvacations.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874111/xivevoba.pdf
    • http://files.kadeandassociates.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738762/7848945.pdf
    • http://files.fortheloveofchildrenmovie.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776176/zaxuzo.pdf
    • http://files.thetypetree.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379663/c80400da70b4.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://xijivoziz.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/suguponase.pdf
    • https://ruxejetufe.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/jomatajo.pdf
    • https://vadobil.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/19782453968.pdf
    • https://xaneren.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/zidafavewirafafexituxune.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/50398535586.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/22511335110.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/75320426607.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/xugufu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/wijabogose.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/7913659608.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006b65.bin
98d09170862ae7cadffcb449fbedcc9089149ac9018addb6f00311128094051c		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6B65 5028 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007c75.bin
ad9fc0d128f991e1dd0142b54f49c66c2ea20831c32e1845372635942ee32d3a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7C75 10484 bytes

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