Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7302a40bf545a4a8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.7 KB Created: 2020-07-09 00:48:52 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 08c6a7d4a5ebf7bc9af5a14911c31e96 SHA-1: dbbaebace8c6e59db9b977ea3ef007e5174037d1 SHA-256: 7302a40bf545a4a8e10753cf20aca265d366c1d0a50e4e15025bc4204b73aeb3
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, with one specifically identified as a malicious redirector. The document body and heuristics indicate a link farm designed to direct users to potentially harmful external sites. The presence of an eval() call suggests potential JavaScript execution within the PDF, which could be used to further obfuscate the malicious redirection.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • eval() call high PDF_EVAL
    eval() found — commonly used for obfuscated exploit execution
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=chroniques%20de%20la%20lune%20noire%20tome%202%20pdf
    • http://files.murthlenesampson.org/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775025/zigusadafi.pdf
    • http://files.seramygames.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856071/xekagariminas_menekifagonuk.pdf
    • http://files.yukonenvirothon.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856382/dopisuwir_vimagovivura_nazusagetabufu_pawigav.pdf
    • http://files.dogtownpestcontrol.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874314/vovuxiti-revuwalowupojig.pdf
    • http://files.finallylivingthedream.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407057/7878713.pdf
    • http://files.seattlefirstbaptist.org/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303080/81e42db7c9176.pdf
    • http://files.rivertowniga.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131409055/3352573.pdf
    • http://files.live-arts.co.uk/uploads/1/3/2/7/132712326/dazenanubeleja-rilegow-sudibebogakob.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://musuzob.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/49494399626.pdf
    • https://popibilowon.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/60493254170.pdf
    • https://jerurig.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/kupuvapogapikezufak.pdf
    • https://zonaselid117862540.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/89419126632.pdf
    • https://pagapot.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/papojezudedapibematetoxun.pdf
    • https://xarezenejo.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/nigiginalawigokotetofepu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/kemisavixazesunomezixe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/16711599054.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/89709194360.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/58097506778.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/81108552740.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000066d7.bin
a54d7d6a210e288022c474a2244eb515d7411dd3994b195c68f2866c397f5d35		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x66D7 5444 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000792d.bin
b9903ef5a52f402141f5164168899b5b3182c2148055cec5deb4aea0b432d334		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x792D 12180 bytes

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