Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 813286282b3db137…

MALICIOUS

PDF

294.1 KB Created: 2010-03-04 18:02:04 +08:00 Authoring application: Adobe LiveCycle Designer ES 8.2
MD5: 52f40a4fbe4c86dfb8f7deaef532846a SHA-1: 3919f0b052cb39c2d77c9f629113eae927987143 SHA-256: 813286282b3db1373a0eb08c1ef6637487ecf8e084a229395aa563a28be54a2c
274 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF document exploits CVE-2010-0188, a known vulnerability in Adobe Reader's handling of XFA forms and LibTIFF images, to achieve code execution. The embedded JavaScript attempts to prompt the user to update their reader by directing them to 'http://cgi.adobe.com/special/acrobat/update', which is likely a lure to download a secondary malicious payload. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9988

Heuristics 11

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.datanumen.com/apdfr/
    • http://ocsp.verisign.com0
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://cgi.adobe.com/special/acrobat/update
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-form/2.8/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xfdf/
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xfa/promoted-desc/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xtd/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/2.8/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://crl.verisign.com/tss-ca.crl0
    • http://crl.verisign.com/ThawteTimestampingCA.crl0
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa01
    • http://crl.verisign.com/pca3.crl0
    • http://CSC3-2004-crl.verisign.com/CSC3-2004.crl0D
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0
    • http://CSC3-2004-aia.verisign.com/CSC3-2004-aia.cer0
    • http://www.adobe.com/typehttp://www.adobe.com/type/legal.html

Extracted artifacts 14

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0007.bin
4a60a9864cdf7382475d51051a03fdc43b32c31eb508893ccfccece34957f9f1
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 7 at offset 0x7988 56 bytes
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
2ebdd7efeaa1190ff6bad8cbd649b313e3969564018f204e7385b97c2fab1e19
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0x7A27 80 bytes
embedded_file_obj0009.bin
5a1ae56b5d79992962cd7a2b90c8a3c925b39e9e9c053cec9dd39fcaabb79b0b
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 9 at offset 0x7ADA 1533 bytes
embedded_file_obj0010.bin
c6f641b94e3ae73b7ddd9d5d3b8ce05e7497e1b6e0c8f3d84a6934d0ae9aada2
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 10 at offset 0x7DA2 142 bytes
embedded_file_obj0011.bin
500856001a9edb17a299f41c8b34871c12c85d56ec8eff03ef181fca24bb96b5
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 11 at offset 0x7E74 200 bytes
embedded_file_obj0012.bin
560dcced2df6f65386a395771a4721a00980be4d89cc752639746882322da5c3
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 12 at offset 0x7F71 2518 bytes
embedded_file_obj0013.bin
6c2e4e7f32a761850c03e67c31c93639dc1b1fd51772bb68e6c84ac01c9cd670
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 13 at offset 0x8262 24647 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).
embedded_file_obj0014.bin
d7fa0bb4b440be27b73f2789111f5954ee699800ac09075cce38842f26f68454
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 14 at offset 0xE30E 1610 bytes
embedded_file_obj0015.bin
73b89e1b97ed7e13506f21b0d6775a3b571f827a570db26ffc730d2694d01cc2
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 15 at offset 0xE624 163 bytes
javascript_obj0037_000.js
826c5622c798d67e5281cca7e05933dddc90ccdcb0a6177c9f7d06f11bef8f7f
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 37 at offset 0xFAAA 2795 bytes
javascript_obj0038_001.js
91ea259764c68d27b8981a339c02d8ea92224ae5c0d0cd0a7c8f3d645d599090
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 38 at offset 0xFD77 902 bytes
javascript_obj0039_002.js
f8721569904600df33f536ddc9f4942717077f9d6c3c4253a8f4de5650fc6531
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 39 at offset 0xFED6 1367 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00000569.bin
3a47365ba29be93b97be381e34ec3c7ef0a10e0f82cdb3dadd6fb11f2800fdb3
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x569 36717 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00039137.pdf
96e3a483be8494e56d76654f9709d70ceb76f6426a2f38992849a119bddbb2d1
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x39137 67371 bytes