Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5f3dc94414e36e51…

MALICIOUS

PDF

254.1 KB Created: 2010-03-04 18:02:04 +08:00 Authoring application: Adobe LiveCycle Designer ES 8.2
MD5: f12dcba3384113978ea875f0800ef589 SHA-1: d30f7bfe3c1bd7655d000147b3eba5387f77cc8a SHA-256: 5f3dc94414e36e51620cb73d46cd962ef9875b7020b9ccd3d7eaf474ead65705
274 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document is flagged as malicious due to critical heuristic firings indicating an exploit for CVE-2010-0188 targeting Adobe Reader's XFA forms. The embedded JavaScript attempts to prompt the user to update Adobe Reader by directing them to 'http://cgi.adobe.com/special/acrobat/update', which is a common lure for exploiting vulnerabilities and downloading further malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9990

Heuristics 11

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.datanumen.com/apdfr/
    • http://ocsp.verisign.com0
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://cgi.adobe.com/special/acrobat/update
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-form/2.8/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xfdf/
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xfa/promoted-desc/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xtd/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/2.8/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://crl.verisign.com/tss-ca.crl0
    • http://crl.verisign.com/ThawteTimestampingCA.crl0
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa01
    • http://crl.verisign.com/pca3.crl0
    • http://CSC3-2004-crl.verisign.com/CSC3-2004.crl0D
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0
    • http://CSC3-2004-aia.verisign.com/CSC3-2004-aia.cer0
    • http://www.adobe.com/typehttp://www.adobe.com/type/legal.html

Extracted artifacts 14

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0007.bin
4a60a9864cdf7382475d51051a03fdc43b32c31eb508893ccfccece34957f9f1
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 7 at offset 0x7988 56 bytes
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
2ebdd7efeaa1190ff6bad8cbd649b313e3969564018f204e7385b97c2fab1e19
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0x7A27 80 bytes
embedded_file_obj0009.bin
5a1ae56b5d79992962cd7a2b90c8a3c925b39e9e9c053cec9dd39fcaabb79b0b
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 9 at offset 0x7ADA 1533 bytes
embedded_file_obj0010.bin
c6f641b94e3ae73b7ddd9d5d3b8ce05e7497e1b6e0c8f3d84a6934d0ae9aada2
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 10 at offset 0x7DA2 142 bytes
embedded_file_obj0011.bin
500856001a9edb17a299f41c8b34871c12c85d56ec8eff03ef181fca24bb96b5
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 11 at offset 0x7E74 200 bytes
embedded_file_obj0012.bin
560dcced2df6f65386a395771a4721a00980be4d89cc752639746882322da5c3
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 12 at offset 0x7F71 2518 bytes
embedded_file_obj0013.bin
69609cc0a4678c948c0eadf54d9a29bcb816e305187bb595928ea67f0d018efe
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 13 at offset 0x8262 24647 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).
embedded_file_obj0014.bin
d7fa0bb4b440be27b73f2789111f5954ee699800ac09075cce38842f26f68454
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 14 at offset 0xE30E 1610 bytes
embedded_file_obj0015.bin
73b89e1b97ed7e13506f21b0d6775a3b571f827a570db26ffc730d2694d01cc2
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 15 at offset 0xE624 163 bytes
javascript_obj0037_000.js
826c5622c798d67e5281cca7e05933dddc90ccdcb0a6177c9f7d06f11bef8f7f
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 37 at offset 0xFAAA 2795 bytes
javascript_obj0038_001.js
91ea259764c68d27b8981a339c02d8ea92224ae5c0d0cd0a7c8f3d645d599090
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 38 at offset 0xFD77 902 bytes
javascript_obj0039_002.js
f8721569904600df33f536ddc9f4942717077f9d6c3c4253a8f4de5650fc6531
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 39 at offset 0xFED6 1367 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00000569.bin
3a47365ba29be93b97be381e34ec3c7ef0a10e0f82cdb3dadd6fb11f2800fdb3
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x569 36717 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0002f137.pdf
d2e0b9832b8ab8b194076551ac3624189814f8f308f719a959f60542057b2ca0
polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0x2F137 67371 bytes