Poison Ivy RAT — PDF malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 809d3775622809d2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

153.4 KB Created: 2007-06-10 22:35:39 +03:00 Authoring application: Writer (via OpenOffice.org 2.2) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 62d80c67e1dfa3a9b693005939c643ff SHA-1: 3081d507ff8aaa19c0d3f4247dce96436b66f402 SHA-256: 809d3775622809d20de7a929465c5cba3100d5a34fee39042a029980d40ffa85
618 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Poison Ivy RAT · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains JavaScript that uses the `exportDataObject` function to launch `cmd.exe` and execute commands, ultimately leading to the execution of an embedded Windows executable disguised as 'PI2.3.2.pdf'. The document body explicitly mentions 'Poison Ivy 2.3.0 Documentation' and describes it as a remote administration tool, confirming the malware family. The embedded URL `http://posionivy-rat.com/` is likely the source for further payloads or C2 communication.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 15

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\PI2.3.2.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://posionivy-rat.com/ PDF link annotation
    • http://posionivy-rat.comPDF link annotation
    • http://www.monotype.comhttp://www.monotype.com/html/type/license.htmlIn extracted file (stream_013_off0001833e.bin)
    • http://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_arial.htmlhttp://www.monotype.com/html/mtname/ms_welcome.htmlNOTIFICATIONIn extracted file (stream_013_off0001833e.bin)

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
PI2.3.2.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 54 at offset 0x24D7B 9216 bytes
SHA-256: 8bc45c5475dbe3f61a63e7fddc2353042caaa495d18a57e548d8b66876267fa8
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Downloader.24568-1
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=PI2.3.2.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_GETPC_CALL, SC_GETPC_CALL
javascript_obj0055_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 55 at offset 0x261CF 56 bytes
SHA-256: d776a2226fa2c0d60dcf160bc14892eb04a1a49534948b13bf6b2f27e4764efd
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "PI2.3.2", nLaunch: 0 });
stream_013_off0001833e.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x1833E 47264 bytes
SHA-256: 8ab00ffa8b605f52a8291a520eecb5bdf98609b8aaa70a7f70526841f27f8b0d
font_01_sfnt_off0001f61e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1F61E 32184 bytes
SHA-256: cd5b8b6106eda36d6d94e4c16a3c601d8c21b7fe401e5adb39a547e3d7eeedf8

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