Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 11

• JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
  PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
• Prototype-pollution JavaScript pattern high CVE related PDF_JS_PROTOTYPE_POLLUTION
  PDF JavaScript mutates object prototypes while also referencing privileged or sensitive PDF APIs. This tracks a modern PDF exploit technique family without assigning an unverified CVE.
• PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
  PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
  Matched line in script

                  j = eval('(' + text + ')');

• Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
  PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
• Active content added after the PDF was signed medium PDF_SIGNATURE_POST_SIGN_MODIFICATION
  An incremental update appended AFTER the signed byte range introduces active content (/EmbeddedFile, /Catalog). Some of this can occur in legitimate form-fill (field scripts, a rewritten /Catalog), so it is suspicious rather than damning — but it is content the signer did not approve.
• Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
  PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
• Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
  PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
• XFA form low PDF_XFA
  PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic (matched inside decoded stream)
• Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
  The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://interfaces.service.aishe.com/ In PDF document text

  • http://aishe.gov.in/aishe/helpOnCollegeInstitution#block2AHelpIn PDF document text
  • http://aishe.gov.in/aishe/helpOnCollegeInstitution#block2BHelpIn PDF document text
  • http://aishe.gov.in/aishe/helpOnCollegeInstitution#block2CHelpIn PDF document text
  • http://aishe.gov.in/aishe/helpOnCollegeInstitution#block2DHelpIn PDF document text
  • http://aishe.gov.in/aishe/helpOnCollegeInstitution#block2EHelpIn PDF document text
  • http://aishe.gov.in/aishe/helpOnCollegeInstitution#block2FHelpIn PDF document text
  • http://aishe.gov.in/aishe/helpOnCollegeInstitution#block2GHelpIn PDF document text
  • http://aishe.gov.in/aishe/helpOnCollegeInstitution#block2HHelpIn PDF document text
  • http://aishe.gov.in/In PDF document text
  • http://aishe.gov.in/aishe/webservice/InstitutionDirectoryIn PDF document text
  • http://aishe.gov.in/aishe/webservice/InstitutionDirectory?wsdlIn PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xfdf/In PDF document text
  • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
  • http://cgi.adobe.com/special/acrobat/updateReferenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-form/2.8/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/In PDF document text
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/data-description/In PDF document text
  • http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/In PDF document text
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/3.0/In PDF document text
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/3.3/In PDF document text
  • http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtmlIn PDF document text
  • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instanceIn PDF document text
  • http://www.JSON.org/js.htmlIn PDF document text
  • http://javascript.crockford.com/jsmin.htmlIn PDF document text
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.6/In PDF document text
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.7/In PDF document text
  • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-connection-set/2.8/In PDF document text

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