MALICIOUS
228
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1059.007 JavaScript
The PDF file is identified as malicious due to a critical heuristic firing for CVE-2010-2883, an Adobe Reader CoolType SING font exploit. The presence of embedded JavaScript, specifically within an XFA form, further indicates malicious intent. The JavaScript code attempts to check for Adobe Reader versions and potentially download updates from a provided URL, which is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9979
Heuristics 10
-
Adobe Reader CoolType SING font exploit — CVE-2010-2883 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_2883PDF embeds a TrueType/OpenType font with an actual SING table and pairs it with JavaScript heap-spray shellcode. This matches the public Adobe Reader CoolType SING exploit shape for CVE-2010-2883.
-
PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTERPDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
-
Encrypted PDF carries /JavaScript — payload hidden from static analysis high PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JSPDF declares /Encrypt and also references an executable trigger (/JavaScript). Document encryption hides the JavaScript body and stream contents from static scanners — combined with auto-execution indicators this is a known evasion pattern used to deliver weaponised JavaScript that the analyst cannot inspect without the decryption key.
-
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
-
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
-
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
-
XFA form low PDF_XFAPDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
-
PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LUREPDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
-
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
-
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://cgi.adobe.com/special/acrobat/update
- http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
- http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/
- http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/2.8/
- http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.4/
- http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/
- http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.7/
- http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xtd/
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xfdf/
- http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-form/2.8/
Extracted artifacts 15
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
embedded_file_obj0012.binf7ee3ef2f8f35d669a6c2b8b0b0ee89655bbc3d04b107a8d22531830f6fc28a1 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 12 at offset 0x18D1 | 86 bytes |
embedded_file_obj0013.bin8aa38aa66bbb66c238f2b2056e2706e71575fe988694258f17d2bf9e80eb10af |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 13 at offset 0x1985 | 1500 bytes |
embedded_file_obj0014.bin742512912da916ed05162ec3e4d245ac05b5310121e973ea4cc4bebeeaa6cc67 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 14 at offset 0x1C59 | 7249 bytes |
embedded_file_obj0015.binda19a956510de42d8522c11b25445b3efa52056541ed94d34b6ccf27c6a9ff47 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 15 at offset 0x26B1 | 159 bytes |
embedded_file_obj0016.bin7a3baf6cd7005199e771f5fac95d2162e961b145b52976bfa7d0f32a10c9758d |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 16 at offset 0x2784 | 3023 bytes |
embedded_file_obj0017.bin4cb349134bdb5f1a1c03281df9b53128ebe947f235398a912a4f0a9f638b24d5 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 17 at offset 0x2B15 | 200 bytes |
embedded_file_obj0018.bin94561903baadce077f2e3349478a5382a04b3be500869799a4aabc53a7a9fcb6 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 18 at offset 0x2C09 | 1223 bytes |
embedded_file_obj0019.bin2ebdd7efeaa1190ff6bad8cbd649b313e3969564018f204e7385b97c2fab1e19 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 19 at offset 0x2E5D | 80 bytes |
embedded_file_obj0020.bin4a60a9864cdf7382475d51051a03fdc43b32c31eb508893ccfccece34957f9f1 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 20 at offset 0x2F07 | 56 bytes |
eflow.jpgba37fe16834bd85f967613ae35e857f09094a0b2d63ee89c455d639970a0e813 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 38 at offset 0x391C | 24941 bytes |
javascript_obj0040_000.jsbb2fe1c0b366bd3a48235c04e822305ef3ab04e575e155f93e34004f56cc10ec |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 40 at offset 0x9B6CE | 2844 bytes |
javascript_obj0041_001.js4a1aca004cf20431c9a66dce85404a6411a54d881a6c257882260ffc972a13eb |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 41 at offset 0x9BA1A | 870 bytes |
javascript_obj0042_002.jsf574e4d51594d1a8fd22e125b109b827c437aa898edc78babb62dbb93f8744f8 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 42 at offset 0x9BB72 | 1532 bytes |
stream_012_off000943a4.bin0601c4b533d97a420b6c976136126d6e4d79c0f357e07bcf80adaf2c57144440 |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x943A4 | 32400 bytes |
|
Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.74, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
|
|||
font_00_sfnt_off0009c6f4.bin426fc31e492fe224eea571b50d4b8a8539f1b24595527e3932236df755edd36a |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9C6F4 | 71524 bytes |
Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.