Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 7315fb2fc53ae9fd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.9 KB Created: 2020-07-08 14:53:25 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 69eb17dd5b7a450dcfa70fb98670ba09 SHA-1: 1769ad69d35d8f48bbe84c63b813de1b9064a484 SHA-256: 7315fb2fc53ae9fdf23e0c7684ad62c3620d848998bb00aa172e56a3721160a3
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable domains and are likely part of a link farm designed to manipulate search engine results or distribute malware. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the overall structure suggests a phishing or malware distribution attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=point%20of%20view%20worksheet%20identifying%20part%201%20answers
    • http://files.kcpanhel.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815961/1055807.pdf
    • http://files.hornsbyptsa.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379434/bomujakurufilo.pdf
    • http://files.chinoteaparty.net/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856135/dawuregoxagufa.pdf
    • http://files.sidleystandup.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775942/3089407.pdf
    • http://files.ccmooresville.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381819/tanupip.pdf
    • http://files.energygroupuniversity.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606670/4d31e1.pdf
    • http://files.bluebearwalhalla.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969386/9878963.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://fejomiburiwe703791076.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/radiwulakimizuzerot.pdf
    • https://zixesope.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/tanareretupogeb.pdf
    • https://vurisivaf.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/55735302793.pdf
    • https://sofusobovax.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/gaxijifozamaxasuporuwede.pdf
    • https://bejidalof.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/7047612397.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000666d.bin
8fc4b7d3b4681b02b2c19fa05be453988431332d0889f4f6fde4cf239fc7831d
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x666D 5428 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000078fc.bin
440d5c46fb79d15f9a9452c2a81cc9f6ca0e2033d79118e2e45a92af763e3733
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x78FC 9856 bytes