Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4f88ef351ecc491b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

33.9 KB Created: 2020-07-08 11:31:41 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-05-07
MD5: 06ad0ff5531d43a0f85d126266b41597 SHA-1: cd167ebb4718e1be5425b67b5b92f4e522d8927e SHA-256: 4f88ef351ecc491baf267fd2a9b92d7d5d1b4457c6b0f43a88140638312fe47b
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to domains associated with SEO link farms. One prominent link redirects to malicious infrastructure, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The document body text and embedded links are designed to lure the user into clicking on the malicious URL under the guise of a performance tuning guide.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=performance%20tuning%20in%20oracle%20pdf%20download In PDF document text
    • http://files.ncam.ac.nz/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776788/a94fe6a1c2f25a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.termarkleather.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682665/85b01c3aa355523.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.juneaumusicmatters.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130968956/ronelipumive.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.sopoochtraining.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815961/kawivibugakovuj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.rockymountainslackline.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969242/tesaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.vintageaffiliated.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776567/5053624.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.themoveablechurch.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874128/9175303.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.surreyhillsmusicfestival.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738758/d3fa4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.mi-sheffield.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606368/niludavifek_rerodotite.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.epicwalk.org/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695572/zafejafizafowav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://fanisutetiga.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/titixiso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wuxewaxijij.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/nomibabuki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://daguxazogas.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/xezazufixejavuke.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nedigitupile.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/55794967425.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wupefosa.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/91727871130.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sifuloli.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/sodifedatu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nuxisesa.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/nabolevavelojosutexu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004a3d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4A3D 5272 bytes
SHA-256: 1f5344a08a742fe98b02c81b266a3c98548efb5fadf3d997e462d605fbb22872
font_01_sfnt_off00005c14.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5C14 8904 bytes
SHA-256: 0b7cd726c7c1cace8665fe8e7a9977ee1727593ecd104932e4d7f8b98a0de674