Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 034f2392c3bac49b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

35.0 KB Created: 2020-07-09 07:09:49 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 4b712ae1fcae61d10142ca181f0879a7 SHA-1: 5c399b23fcd69eded5cee53cf34c6732d8ab3100 SHA-256: 034f2392c3bac49b09d0ea0eb83c516e5f315f45313e9cdb3dacef320294bbcf
214 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, many of which point to external PDF files hosted on various domains, suggesting a link farm or SEO poisoning tactic. One critical heuristic indicates a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure, and ClamAV detected it as Pdf.Dropper.Agent. The document body text, though obfuscated, includes a URL that appears to be the primary lure. No scripts were extracted from this sample.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-9220366-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-9220366-0
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=daily%20math%20practice%20grade%204%20pdf
    • http://files.nlg-pros.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969910/katixiratowapo.pdf
    • http://files.mi-sheffield.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606368/niludavifek_rerodotite.pdf
    • http://files.jackblairgray.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384018/eede518175.pdf
    • http://files.saradps.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740545/mejurigumamiba.pdf
    • http://files.mxsnot.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775371/badakolizaxikit-xezodeti-tajexirumogum.pdf
    • http://files.1210photography.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814967/veruxova_zirugo.pdf
    • http://files.summasportswear.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453807/118d8e22a22790b.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://fesopalom.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/welufovevi.pdf
    • https://gipugof.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/97787471128.pdf
    • https://xobowirali.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/82640267614.pdf
    • https://jejiwivu.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/rezumeroredubotep.pdf
    • https://zopowozofoje.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/6678237513.pdf
    • https://dijeduzibug.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/15627486792.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/xoxolesusoziviro.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/62042090741.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/tozonolemudafolafoxi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/84312174386.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004d93.bin
ca10152e81580e24047e44f18b47e40a5e03230bfe7a195292afbd23f0e29d1b		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4D93 5152 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00005f25.bin
3206b5ec04d9c82edf02ffdbaca127a73141de1cc8f5d5424e788027a272f494		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5F25 9372 bytes

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