Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4a035ecb18bf334f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.2 KB Created: 2020-08-14 09:33:55 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 8effb3723964d9f7675e30869f0f5bb6 SHA-1: f352abf798568edcbbeaf15f8571678abeb7650e SHA-256: 4a035ecb18bf334f278dc7cdec79ef3eb5f68117f0560b93d435d7ca4c2ea330
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains a link that redirects to a malicious URL, identified by the PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK heuristic. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text referencing 'Cathay pacific cargo schedule pdf' and the malicious URL itself, suggesting a lure to trick users into clicking the link. The PDF also contains a large number of external links, as indicated by the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic, which likely serve to obscure the malicious redirector.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=cathay%20pacific%20cargo%20schedule%20pdf
    • http://files.catherinetrinkle.net/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874125/608214.pdf
    • http://files.mx.thomasmadden.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437457/kavituvavotugaz_babefuda.pdf
    • http://files.jennacole.org/uploads/1/3/1/8/131858791/duvibijafagudad.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/1149/6347/files/zamabavazoxifaxiwofiruba.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/1198/0964/files/jovizivume.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5850/3573/files/89362141698.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/5297/1685/files/customer_service_interview_questions_and_answers.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/8236/6629/files/luterumojivivuxu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5122/0134/files/vipuwaguxigefe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/0305/2191/files/pigekewevedodegov.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0447/7802/9213/files/administrao_financeira_e_oramentria_minhateca.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/9611/1259/files/viessmann_vitola_biferral.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/8998/3640/files/oblivion_custom_race_fix.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/8323/4470/files/60173083655.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/62654677968.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0314/9462/files/12435096452.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005e08.bin
547829c3994a751c047f95cef7a51a7511782178d25a62c234f67f0d5bf5b8ba		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5E08 5424 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000707d.bin
713b3873676350b9f2c5ef57f0e23db69e11b44572b1aadc49856f7ef5245615		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x707D 10568 bytes

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