Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 47cea11182151e9b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.5 KB Created: 2021-05-28 04:54:22 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 3fc69eb8be976632a9ebc297b6013301 SHA-1: dc10a75ee239cbe42f2d43c9ea28f21368408099 SHA-256: 47cea11182151e9b8e20622bac7b85449388173afff1af6b90c2550a6204dcc3
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF file contains a large number of external links, many pointing to disposable domains and Weebly-hosted PDFs, indicating a link farm or SEO spamming operation. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or distributing malware. The embedded URLs and the nature of the link farm suggest an attempt to lure users to malicious content or manipulate search engine rankings.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9995

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://fokemale.ru/strik?utm_term=pride+and+prejudice+chapter+summaries+volume+3 PDF link annotation
    • https://votadewigul.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775387/kunilasi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://panulozeti.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135351273/4cc936dbda82567.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4367311/normal_5fe195b8d7953.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4451019/normal_60415bc0049ad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zesefonivileje.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437583/3fb75c243a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4446774/normal_6008c6fabd267.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4494874/normal_5fda386240b35.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lisamotakix.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134308999/9b27f4a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pudodogefelareb.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606347/rosobek-gitujis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mivebomuponi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398008/mufifakegolegotixe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mawokivujuruti.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134685386/8861202.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2afc6024-ddb8-4052-9235-88913f23fab7/2516467535.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/bd27b196-a558-4c68-812a-2b40b6beb99d/kunubotetanemusoluzek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/bbe8e446-75ae-41b3-8eb2-ad7403ea0a16/keurig_k45_elite_descaling_instructions.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/72f18cd5-7fce-4c64-ace5-15cb64faa5f3/63581853441.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/11766987-182d-46f2-b2e8-6776f9c4af12/40632303075.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/811a26f8-89af-4fcd-9848-e0e4edbe495c/12999804712.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/009e5379-770d-4cce-837d-f661fd26c354/rorovelurexopi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/dc4198ba-dd4f-411f-b3ae-625cc7a9c1af/bikuxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/bae17d06-8f9f-4c5e-92ce-7c9a8af6fdf8/6mm_creedmoor_load_data.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2d4445d8-af55-4c09-a8be-964f09917730/what_is_the_main_advantages_of_variable_length_subnet_mask_explain_with_example.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2b60fbdb-046a-4c72-8e64-a10f60049e01/razipaferib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ebba.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEBBA 5496 bytes
SHA-256: e13c4ef74d72b6a6935f916be2ce94467d09781a3ba9051f8d6707aff3c28394
font_01_sfnt_off0000fe3e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFE3E 10452 bytes
SHA-256: e701338a14afb7ad140566d33f7a5c3745556fe72d2cfc7eba608c4abaa32b7a
font_02_sfnt_off000121fd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x121FD 4324 bytes
SHA-256: d1f4a20f0e35a0564be54678b929bb8c711862c507f070c2b9a6abea8daf4378