Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 e803ff24a99ea854…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.9 KB Created: 2021-06-09 22:56:53 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 0efba169ced7e30c96129efca4abda78 SHA-1: d0cd3ac081f56260e03ac2111058b0675c68294f SHA-256: e803ff24a99ea8541e0b3e227ae51ebb9832b532b01e325464119977872a9f9f
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating it likely exploits a vulnerability for client execution. The file contains a large number of embedded external links, many pointing to disposable hosting services, suggesting a link farm or redirection mechanism. The primary URL observed is https://synerhu.ru/pbw?utm_term=free+printable+pre+k+math+worksheets, which appears to be part of a campaign to drive traffic to numerous other sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://synerhu.ru/pbw?utm_term=free+printable+pre+k+math+worksheets
    • https://xemexetizepe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/6/0/136094173/19068ed084c4181.pdf
    • https://toxupenowa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134042648/604373ce813169.pdf
    • https://wadomojare.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134472746/8834776.pdf
    • https://tijisevivojo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134502531/jeponamufonodad_xutufufaxenetag_davugawu.pdf
    • https://mamudige.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874639/792488dd.pdf
    • https://vevusivo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874001/2059213.pdf
    • https://nuvutujozexavu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134131277/e4827c.pdf
    • https://sowubibuf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134308786/noxebajewepe.pdf
    • https://panulozeti.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135351273/2316381.pdf
    • https://warenumew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134871813/nanaderododari_paneruj_xidimitoj.pdf
    • https://gakutuzopekok.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134605442/02d4c0c83d25.pdf
    • https://samomalekadoj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438786/jipopiwuxidije-rixumiremud-dananigilawafuf-kesozote.pdf
    • https://rilejaxetikisoj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134391290/595480.pdf
    • https://bogonifad.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134108647/xurujikul.pdf
    • https://tebuzemuba.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134042716/84701df.pdf
    • https://mipurilor.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131071035/7899546.pdf
    • https://vujafufitagizej.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132696128/tigusedizaluni.pdf
    • https://rozogefeju.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398259/xeruzafeveluw_runazoz_rokeluze.pdf
    • https://xadijonoru.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133997446/duluvaduxu_fafinenulolud_navifer.pdf
    • https://mivebomuponi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398008/af1965c9e4b1.pdf
    • https://gukilebulasule.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682884/letes.pdf
    • https://tifuvanolini.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134703883/fotatazota.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e7a0.bin
dd83792c82634b5fa1af70ed1e35ef19e743ab232b6f00642c0c328572f3d356
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE7A0 5312 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f992.bin
6f7dffe23e8f39b0b5f94b0805c78afddc76bf1e3de29a6d0fd26ac0f56f584c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF992 10776 bytes