Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Heuristics 9

• ClamAV: Win.Worm.IFeel-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Worm.IFeel-1
• VBA project inside OOXML medium 6 related findings OOXML_VBA
  Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
• VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
  VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
  Matched line in script

          objStream.Write objXMLHTTP.ResponseBody

• Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
  Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  Matched line in script

      strDocumentsPath = CreateObject(Chr(87) & Chr(83) & Chr(99) & Chr(114) & Chr(105) & Chr(112) & Chr(116) & Chr(46) & Chr(83) & Chr(104) & Chr(101) & Chr(108) & Chr(108)).SpecialFolders(Chr(77) & Chr(121) & Chr(68) & Chr(111) & Chr(99) & Chr(117) & Chr(109) & Chr(101) & Chr(110) & Chr(116) & Chr(115))

• CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
  CreateObject call
  Matched line in script

      strDocumentsPath = CreateObject(Chr(87) & Chr(83) & Chr(99) & Chr(114) & Chr(105) & Chr(112) & Chr(116) & Chr(46) & Chr(83) & Chr(104) & Chr(101) & Chr(108) & Chr(108)).SpecialFolders(Chr(77) & Chr(121) & Chr(68) & Chr(111) & Chr(99) & Chr(117) & Chr(109) & Chr(101) & Chr(110) & Chr(116) & Chr(115))

• GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
  GetObject call
  Matched line in script

      Set objWMIService = GetObject(Chr(119) & Chr(105) & Chr(110) & Chr(109) & Chr(103) & Chr(109) & Chr(115) & Chr(58) & Chr(46) & Chr(92) & Chr(46) & Chr(92) & Chr(114) & Chr(111) & Chr(111) & Chr(116) & Chr(92) & Chr(99) & Chr(105) & Chr(109) & Chr(118) & Chr(50))

• VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
  Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
• Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
  Document_Open macro
  Matched line in script

  Private Sub Document_Open()

• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas Referenced by macro

  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006Referenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2019/extlstReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2023/wordml/word16duReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahashReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2024/wordml/sdtformatlockReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlReferenced by macro
  • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeReferenced by macro

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