Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3b0f974a5e5a5b80…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.4 KB Created: 2020-07-09 11:56:52 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-24
MD5: a0c7af2a0e3443999e0fbf42f55fce55 SHA-1: 1bba782014dc3351f4e7d54d26021fcf40c75af4 SHA-256: 3b0f974a5e5a5b80d87fdc7a0827d8ecee1d92fd500e2e39b0963d884983d41f
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, with one identified as a malicious redirector and others forming a link farm. This suggests a tactic to drive traffic to potentially malicious or SEO-abused sites. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=applications+of+ford+circles In PDF document text
    • http://files.pcbyrd.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406049/kekepujawaton.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.fresnonutritionsolutions.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132683111/9806049.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.shearserenitysalon.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383553/53b9878d6b0f11.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.qcalogistics.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775561/foloju.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.rhythmresearchresources.net/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606127/gelizoxi-mevep-xuzumifam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.mi-sheffield.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606368/niludavifek_rerodotite.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.thetracytrust.co.uk/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398252/gekivuvos_jafinugixasomep_kemib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.andrewveivers.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302924/3223912.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.alishaniaphotography.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302924/fulapidi-xegogijil-xenedi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://nejogisekebo617157682.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/gavuzopelajofitabex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zipojuroxob.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/79950953657.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://laxosuval.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/kenudijizijipinojagawukud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/zutazalurofesavasa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/35035436777.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/ruwisosipopiwusanitilowaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/fovurasavelibegesixaga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/79265304831.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006933.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6933 4928 bytes
SHA-256: c52305a3370376db038ca88604919ef003d90526262365512093b46db0759030
font_01_sfnt_off000079f2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x79F2 11380 bytes
SHA-256: ac493ba5cce0b47d00a179f960a1170f6be88618531da538fe240e5040abd8e2

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