Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3abcac8745c52c29…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.9 KB Created: 2021-08-15 13:56:59 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-01
MD5: 66ac75fc69c5776c5b08fdd39f538e2a SHA-1: a30a9c06c33a2253856c8331a2cc39c83eff46d9 SHA-256: 3abcac8745c52c2903301fac157b775026926dd1f13e8540ed3b773503a895b8
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and ML classifiers, indicating a phishing or trojan payload. The heuristics suggest it acts as a lure, potentially for a callback phishing scam or tech-support pretext, instructing the user to call a number or handle a password-protected archive. Multiple URLs point to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting, likely serving as download locations for secondary payloads.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9988

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://habibitours.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/31325553910.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://xn--90ad5ackt1d.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/318bd3f91153942a048a9021e2c5e37a/vopev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gauravkankariya.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/enb8scp25kivsd7nd57co098t5/vafawoxijunavagofafu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hfdjet.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/cdf76eb5157fcd41b1a34571c4a89086/legusowakik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.rockfallco.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606c96bdf267b---tuvub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bettenbaehren.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16082536a85e6a---11610980280.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://group-anons.ru/userfiles/files/fifotaruv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://purpleleafestatebuyers.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1610d6cec1191a---83410225923.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://igruppe.no/ckfinder/userfiles//files/gunal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://irisapp.cn/uploadfiles/fckeditor/20210716/file/16263966377277.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://snabavto.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160fff93b71331---4410890907.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bf-pomosch.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/uf9uj3655dj0vrjtbdkj6k30k7/dinotoregum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dirabrealtors.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607fa5920ffae---6709695281.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://79.170.40.182/boothtastic.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16086e12d4eb89---fodezopodojerovakoxamil.pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://strategie-online.net/catalogue_dynamique/file/nupukobusakawase.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://eiak.org/upload/editor/files/10136522298.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.audifonosdoshoydos.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607127261dbe6---xikedupatojis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vudafrique.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9ef1e99053b4c5422ad64259c2b44463/11237389603.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://skup-laptopow.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16084aa4c5c868---66970851397.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sciencevier.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160f1ce37d7f9d---javaxerabivojiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://allg-gyn.ch/userfiles/file/13985682334.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.communityheroesproject.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16098af750a9df---mojidudebebipasime.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/1xuhb7AK25c/uplcv?utm_term=does+turo+have+a+customer+service+numberPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ea01.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEA01 10756 bytes
SHA-256: d60a3ea41cb54734a7b71817f075636b5c0be30c921ab7c4a91e47a34c9cbc07
font_01_sfnt_off000102a3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x102A3 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00011ab5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11AB5 17528 bytes
SHA-256: a5fc058ce51f1f0d80db6fc004c0faa86d3a03788f1e10c21bbd1bbec59cb6ac