Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 3812c1ecfc209a7d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

66.4 KB Created: 2020-08-29 22:11:18 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: ae92473320a0a712779a5be511b35e74 SHA-1: 293910b7225f561a8230f74104f103344665a6b0 SHA-256: 3812c1ecfc209a7da28dc197c8f6b2d73cd5b355d693f003aa41bdf56a2ee555
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious Link T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains a mass external link farm and a critical heuristic firing for a malicious redirector link pointing to 'https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=android+sdk+28.+0.+3'. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains this URL and also exhibits heuristics for clipboard command lures and password-protected archive lures, suggesting a multi-stage attack. The primary intent appears to be directing the user to the malicious URL to download further malicious content.

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Cloud document impersonation lure medium SE_CLOUD_DOC_LURE
    Document impersonates a cloud file-sharing service such as SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox, Box, or Microsoft 365 and asks the user to open, verify, or access a shared document
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wix?keyword=android+sdk+28.+0.+3
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/ee6770_8bb506c4c3db48a18089c24d100ffb19.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/bd5c68_29a14002caee4f1098ca2e543fbf67f6.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_8391d399524e49a5851cc79f6c8e9f19.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/43d598_f565c2f897f84292873e3445bc40b9de.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_e1170fe5bb9b42beaf18c4ff951fc045.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_cec2a0b50b054a15a341cc5fa677495b.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/f3ecbe_0c473f6fb19b45839080c3de241c505c.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_17b5cb38d3bf4ada83ceb24de350cd4a.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_06726444992e4d47ac4fef5d33b314e5.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_20d82a16a88e4f5791e57b7def2b1a52.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_586882f55bae49f7be74bbd8bae9132f.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/8de238_5b678196caa640c990a2c882f016b9f6.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/0baf77_52c2a96703954ab5b84c9d992d1e40dc.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/b8c837_5d8179d1e34848bc88fe64cc0c54dca9.pdf
    • https://static.usrfiles.com/ugd/a48928_409c68ca8b5e4e608161e52e555dc890.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b9d9.bin
1c73982c7e02ab729cf0d7fd889f125ee9d7f16f115ed4e405401d7fd13a5f64		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB9D9 5292 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000cbea.bin
6fad6dd980c250369a32760abed88ea9f89e50def3fd9ab286fdb687285a09aa		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCBEA 15736 bytes

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