Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 111c334e59723c11…

MALICIOUS

PDF

63.7 KB Created: 2020-08-22 15:41:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 7d2579c2844d1e14d065e6ef8fae4847 SHA-1: 738e38e0c1716c4713031768ea756d91f28033d0 SHA-256: 111c334e59723c11405e37ac724a5e336d0745a2a745247e9d9b46ea2e8e5a7c
254 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to a link farm hosted on Shopify, and one critical link to a known malicious redirector. The document also includes lures related to clipboard commands and password-protected archives, suggesting an attempt to trick the user into executing malicious content or downloading further payloads. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, supporting the assessment of a phishing or redirection attack.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Cloud document impersonation lure medium SE_CLOUD_DOC_LURE
    Document impersonates a cloud file-sharing service such as SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox, Box, or Microsoft 365 and asks the user to open, verify, or access a shared document
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=android+sdk+folder+macos
    • http://files.delcoalliance.org/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606890/6324387.pdf
    • http://zubilamim.frenchpeakwines.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407164/doniniwo_gutesuvokis_xepoka_zevike.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/7735/2089/files/toy_blast_game_apkpure.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7315/8812/files/28616194613.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/pegofegomena.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/4267/6636/files/ledotuziwizanapal.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6490/1270/files/1871052079.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/2143/4023/files/towogubijul.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/2119/7724/files/zowoviminojozunesi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/2814/3510/files/zakonosagejaj.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6948/8798/files/memedizil.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/2891/4074/files/vemenowumafekejab.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b048.bin
13769eab41c7771ef9262f4925c2bb36b9f1b54d10b7bd4d188ffdf346fa18e5		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB048 5220 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000c1ed.bin
c955d9856fe134c72d5ba2f13b84e33082a642b6803e6f7bc2d0c8c4a3875b0a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC1ED 15736 bytes

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