Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 328d8b1e0b408aba…

MALICIOUS

PDF

259.7 KB Created: 2009-08-30 00:20:17 UTC Authoring application: AdobePS5.dll Version 5.2.2 (via Mac OS X 10.5.8 Quartz PDFContext) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 07818af0771f2adc52d2da46d19132a1 SHA-1: 61ed91011dcb463e6bc00a1d2402d7f708d9e245 SHA-256: 328d8b1e0b408ababd234e16dccdb01c6a6099d7531787345d73413b4aa0d3b7
516 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and a critical heuristic firing for PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND indicates that cmd.exe is launched with specific parameters. This is further supported by the CVE_2010_1240 detection, which points to an exploit chain involving a launch action and an embedded executable payload. The embedded executable payload is decompressed from a PDF stream. The likely intent is to exploit a vulnerability to execute the embedded payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\form.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL tcp://192.168.1.6:8888 In extracted file (form.pdf)
    • tcp://48.133.192.15:33732In extracted file (form.pdf)
    • http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off000002d6.icc)

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
form.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 21 at offset 0x3BA1 454656 bytes
SHA-256: 48eed816b82305f0aed08ec2e24dfa58c17876b4785e9f4c831582293afca43a
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=form.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.1.6:8888 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)); 48.133.192.15:33732 (reverse/x64, public) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: shell32.dll, ShellExecuteA, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress, CreateProcessA, VirtualAlloc
javascript_obj0022_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 22 at offset 0x40B08 53 bytes
SHA-256: eff4a0943aaff2d99cb5c8666337775c91d4d5f687782df94d2c5fc77becde7f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "form", nLaunch: 0 });
icc_00_off000002d6.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x2D6 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e
font_00_sfnt_off00000e23.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE23 13900 bytes
SHA-256: ac6efb60566e49cb2cc918348e471fe3f01c12322c4aa7ec58d84bf608cab323