MALICIOUS
598
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1059.007 JavaScript
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that leverages the CVE-2010-1240 vulnerability to execute cmd.exe. This command then launches a dropped executable payload, disguised as 'form.pdf' and 'roger.pdf', which was detected by ClamAV as a Windows Trojan with reverse TCP capabilities. The embedded JavaScript explicitly calls 'this.exportDataObject' to save and launch these files, indicating a dropper functionality.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999
Heuristics 14
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Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
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ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
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Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCHPDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
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Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
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/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMANDPDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\form.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
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Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCHAn /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
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Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JSPDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
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PDF embedded file could not be fully decoded medium PDF_EMBEDDED_FILE_UNDECODEDA declared PDF /EmbeddedFile stream uses filters that the scanner could not decode. The raw stream was carved for artifact triage because malformed or unsupported attachment filters can hide payload content from normal extraction.
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JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
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Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTALThe same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL tcp://192.168.1.6:4444 In extracted file (form.pdf)
- http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off000002d6.icc)
Extracted artifacts 5
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
form.pdf |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 21 at offset 0x3B9E | 37888 bytes |
SHA-256: fd50bf82847fffa531011c3fd3f56518f640c3b9f18cbff19180f9b60b5e0ba4 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Trojan.ShellcodeReverseTcp-1
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=form.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.1.6:4444 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_BIND, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: GetProcAddress, ExitProcess, LoadLibraryA, VirtualAlloc Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): cmd
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javascript_obj0022_000.js |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 22 at offset 0x8858 | 53 bytes |
SHA-256: eff4a0943aaff2d99cb5c8666337775c91d4d5f687782df94d2c5fc77becde7f |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "form", nLaunch: 0 });
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javascript_obj0026_001.js |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 26 at offset 0x8CB6 | 54 bytes |
SHA-256: 90fc7d0d91dd7385506de6b490860070e7ae7868af61851fa5a23039011a3d7d |
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "roger", nLaunch: 0 });
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icc_00_off000002d6.icc |
pdf-icc-profile | PDF ICC profile at offset 0x2D6 | 3144 bytes |
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e |
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font_00_sfnt_off00000e23.bin |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE23 | 13900 bytes |
SHA-256: ac6efb60566e49cb2cc918348e471fe3f01c12322c4aa7ec58d84bf608cab323 |
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