PDF malware analysis — malicious · 3096fb7070803f8b

MALICIOUS

PDF

187.2 KB Created: 2017-08-04 12:46:31 UTC Authoring application: TeX (via MiKTeX pdfTeX-1.40.17) First seen: 2026-05-04

MD5: bf153c158a961ea6ec872b8256b6700d SHA-1: 387a973511bbf53abb2524e716fae2b222efdfd0 SHA-256: 3096fb7070803f8b258f5ed7dcd97b22bf83823f00167efdda45f15b315b9bb5

576 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1187 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file exploits CVE-2010-1240 via a launch action to execute cmd.exe. The embedded artifact, declared as 'math.pdf', is actually a Windows executable payload detected by ClamAV as 'Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7'. The PDF also contains JavaScript that pairs with the launch action, indicating a dropper functionality. The ML classifier strongly flagged this as malicious.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9955

Heuristics 12

Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240

PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH

PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD

PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND

PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\math.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH

An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
Suspicious extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS

PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://www.zeustech.net/ In extracted file (math.pdf)
- http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (math.pdf)
- tcp://192.168.1.11:4444In extracted file (math.pdf)
- http://www.apache.org/In extracted file (math.pdf)
- http://www.ams.orgIn extracted file (font_00_type1_off000151f2.bin)
- http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn extracted file (font_00_type1_off000151f2.bin)

🗂 Part of campaign: shared payload 03bd27f81b 3 samples

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`math.pdf`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 228 at offset 0x23C26	73802 bytes
SHA-256: `ca5a5990c4a21ec7959dce504b281dca314d57106e57cdd0939ab66890ad8a38`
Detection ClamAV: Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7 Obfuscation or payload: likely actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=math.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis recovered the Metasploit stager connect-back address: 192.168.1.11:4444 (reverse/x86, lab (non-routable)) Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_MSF_REVERSE, SC_PUSH_STRING Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
`javascript_obj0229_000.js`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 229 at offset 0x2E856	53 bytes
SHA-256: `ff01c43fef6ce43e3f48a976e49ad5f9539195804ab42c870e34672c22983e44`
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script this.exportDataObject({ cName: "math", nLaunch: 0 });
`font_00_type1_off000151f2.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (type1) at offset 0x151F2	7276 bytes
SHA-256: `f72dbed8bb057acc6fa53d2029a4134cf085919d92c1b481a2f641095768b51e`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 7.83, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
`font_01_type1_off00016e05.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (type1) at offset 0x16E05	11194 bytes
SHA-256: `c85e70b5306a04589e567e7521fc4f74230d7dbf4d2780cb0c1f84879fdb6924`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 7.90, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
`font_02_type1_off00019925.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (type1) at offset 0x19925	11711 bytes
SHA-256: `4abecec04823017ced1d690f97988c135cf5eb84e563bb5eb0438ea183027ea2`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 7.90, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
`font_03_type1_off0001c622.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (type1) at offset 0x1C622	8958 bytes
SHA-256: `3932613c86c5d5910218cf60ea103f5c4755bfd1203da1af211fdb849f81ac38`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 7.86, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
`font_04_type1_off0001e8bd.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (type1) at offset 0x1E8BD	7832 bytes
SHA-256: `03bd27f81b3d08969581a26e18cef6f41af8cdf82302f88ccb51e791f77a7f52`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 7.85, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
`font_05_type1_off000206f9.bin`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (type1) at offset 0x206F9	7629 bytes
SHA-256: `71560e402607a269a2a558903177519106dc8596e8ff1d3159ae79a8fd68c0d4`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 7.84, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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Malware Insights

Machine Learning

Heuristics 12

Related samples 8

Extracted artifacts 8