PDF malware analysis — malicious · 23b134c4895136e8

MALICIOUS

PDF

114.9 KB

MD5: af73765ec0e74bd3f60b0c769784d11a SHA-1: ee8efa6392621ab514daf7669a6e28144bef65fd SHA-256: 23b134c4895136e805058ef25319e57d2203f8bc6c37b9d6f2ca92d976673585

516 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF contains JavaScript that uses the exportDataObject function to launch an embedded executable disguised as 'fiche_de_paie.pdf'. This executable is then likely executed via cmd.exe, as indicated by the PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND heuristic. The embedded executable was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7, confirming its malicious nature. The overall technique aligns with spearphishing attachments used to deliver malware.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9970

Heuristics 12

Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240

PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH

PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD

PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND

PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\fiche_de_paie.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH

An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
ClamAV: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7239558-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Dropper.Agent-7239558-0
ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV

ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS

PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED

PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://www.zeustech.net/
- http://]hostname[:port]/path
- http://www.apache.org/
- http://www.iec.ch

Extracted artifacts 11

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`fiche_de_paie.pdf` `18bc529f9cad9fdeeb5782863d006aa470ed3ba73b43f80ef36521b492a93503`	pdf-embedded-file	PDF EmbeddedFile object 70 at offset 0x11A8A	73802 bytes
Detection ClamAV: Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-7 Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
`javascript_obj0071_000.js` `6cd4ee909b92cf7de72b676e401eb34e5224366a7ff04331b9a18373c9079d69`	pdf-javascript-stream	PDF /JS object 71 at offset 0x1C6EB	62 bytes
`icc_00_off00003fd5.icc` `2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e`	pdf-icc-profile	PDF ICC profile at offset 0x3FD5	3144 bytes
`icc_01_off00004aab.icc` `61cfd900e5194258adf98bcb3d44311afa42d9c0372d2050ffd9e6975a4d069c`	pdf-icc-profile	PDF ICC profile at offset 0x4AAB	2036 bytes
`icc_02_off00004fa7.icc` `0fb37c4328cacebb547210723e15a9fe040ef5a17e5b496e993ca68db0126a88`	pdf-icc-profile	PDF ICC profile at offset 0x4FA7	2008 bytes
`font_00_sfnt_off000057d6.bin` `c78989a39e084c41c90c53241bcaf5cd50189902472be290818e9e8e900e3ced`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x57D6	12488 bytes
`font_01_sfnt_off000074af.bin` `0b07bd34e8c46e01a77719b65de93d092eeb040ce587cf72ff5967f7d93ddb3d`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x74AF	11256 bytes
`font_02_sfnt_off00009227.bin` `95a1a63bb1c056b2c8ecdc68a7209dd3f9a566494a98e2b5ec63f2f7b3e0fef4`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9227	15988 bytes
`font_03_sfnt_off0000be7c.bin` `ac1efaaa2671d1753e3096a93c10ebad68cbe98153922cd9e87999c7e37951b8`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBE7C	5468 bytes
`font_04_sfnt_off0000cd80.bin` `11500a68480e170167444eef89ccc470dc43feb7e1051d64b83381581557bf2d`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCD80	20744 bytes
`font_05_sfnt_off00010735.bin` `85e8776995a5d9d6f3c2d58554827a13b01c6d8d8cfd5e936929c5faa2b79c90`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10735	5060 bytes

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