Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 20dda3646eb28710…

MALICIOUS

PDF

53.4 KB Created: 2020-08-14 12:49:47 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 89c57a54c949ae882c25159358c776e2 SHA-1: a81ee7b57210967f554adeb9ed5af085f0aee48d SHA-256: 20dda3646eb28710e32e18247a68f1f8993df516c777a6c3be0e7ef2b7a79728
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF file contains numerous embedded links, with a critical heuristic identifying a link to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the target URL and references to other PDF files hosted on Shopify. This suggests a link farm or redirection strategy to deliver a malicious payload or conduct phishing. No scripts were extracted, limiting the analysis of direct execution behavior.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=charing+cross+road+former+bookshop
    • http://files.thefeltfactory.co.nz/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776841/xizixexa-dajawotubep-fekifomidele.pdf
    • http://files.naopuppet.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164431/kidivegeke.pdf
    • http://files.juliancooper.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070109/4371710.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/9628/6111/files/lojozaxanipilonenusa.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/6350/9146/files/34872110794.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/0866/2440/files/gexagutiwet.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9377/8837/files/51706951875.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/8646/2628/files/golagivaworijorederudozoz.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7417/4624/files/international_business_7th_edition.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/5900/4070/files/bewej.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/0874/3835/files/ccna_cyber_ops_book.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/nenixuraxolitater.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/6431/8359/files/capacitors_download.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/8861/8396/files/12180676769.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/3966/0951/files/favegimebevoka.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/8548/6485/files/28942104713.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000080d8.bin
f4032dcaf95f62987cc45fac09e3f74d22cacfda547daafed6acea8c7f0a601b
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x80D8 5272 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009303.bin
c0fc84e22977bb529237fc25bb9e725822055c89af5d8c3e8871c20523fa5752
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9303 5644 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000a605.bin
daf23f814f70727bf3269ce5d06f56a47931e2f66f9130e380d2e9da21ca9797
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA605 10116 bytes