Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ab1bcebbc7e1782b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.2 KB Created: 2020-07-09 11:00:28 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-08-10
MD5: 2b4f03c69c958b6f397afcf2370fb91a SHA-1: 901f65dc00717b2d4e631c9fa3c6013ddc8356eb SHA-256: ab1bcebbc7e1782b307305ede437078370d0427b4356bc248d6ebb5b1902c36c
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The PDF contains a lure instructing the user to copy and paste content into a shell, combined with a large number of embedded links. One link redirects to a known malicious infrastructure, and many others point to PDF files hosted on various domains, suggesting an SEO poisoning or link farm attack. The primary intent appears to be directing users to malicious or deceptive content through these links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=bit+mesra+syllabus+pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.coloradospringsspaandsalon.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384214/gufevizakobidis-takitabadit-xerikugorugemel-roxinijopifeva.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.vernongayle.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681954/473e1be06e3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.clarevet.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738814/6baf8b64a8319.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.saintwindowcleaningcornwall.co.uk/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379219/3220933.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.uk.lollandfalsterairport.dk/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606631/4936149.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.northpointcg.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070938/kasegafofu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.jaxwoodworkers.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814124/bozujevor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.kengoesclick.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437513/4c988cc4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.thefeltfactory.co.nz/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776841/xizixexa-dajawotubep-fekifomidele.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://jojarifi.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/fubil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mebanebezog.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/joxorenuzerixolawize.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://retasaxaza.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/wofotipujalulinusojuxota.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/bugasodaliza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/gegexovikorojirokelaxedu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/lufixupiz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/50751207741.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005d39.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5D39 5144 bytes
SHA-256: e267c56b190497687683f5dbe3280e517fc859d9b87454a0535646b1bbff8230
font_01_sfnt_off00006eb2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6EB2 9832 bytes
SHA-256: f5e4b1ac658d83149163ea394367bca13ddf25bc3b3f57d0102112b5311983eb