Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 202aed1c13af68a5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

2.9 KB First seen: 2026-04-08
MD5: 97af6b3804591bd203bffe4d666513fb SHA-1: c6200c7c7564f9cbea0a6d07fc56093af1eb423e SHA-256: 202aed1c13af68a578be302cc273bfbff0e00d801a8c4dba027314a64d911993
534 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\template.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
template.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0x3B1 6656 bytes
SHA-256: f575f54987c6c10e7c8d18f08b496bfc9d89f8be275edebddc4788a9ff135933
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.MSShellcode-6
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=template.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC, SC_PEB_ACCESS_X64 Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, VirtualAlloc, ExitProcess
javascript_obj0009_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 9 at offset 0x694 57 bytes
SHA-256: bc1d5cdfa608238e3cd965aa51949d02f8ab713463ea0beb61ec928b121788d1
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "template", nLaunch: 0 });