Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1d5d162013cdca9a…

MALICIOUS

RTF

662.3 KB First seen: 2026-05-24
MD5: 10820fc81129fb705eebdb3249cb334a SHA-1: fb188467c460ec646aa34f7aabc489327329468f SHA-256: 1d5d162013cdca9a88cfe6610863be82ad961d9f5f6caf1b13e3882b5fa05fa5
340 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

The sample is an RTF document containing multiple embedded OLE objects and a composite moniker, which is a characteristic pattern for remote template injection or exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-11882. The presence of a content-enable lure is designed to trick the user into activating the content. No scripts were extracted from the sample, but the structural analysis of the OLE objects and the high-risk heuristics indicate a high probability of payload delivery via OLE activation.

Heuristics 9

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • CVE-2017-0199 / CVE-2017-8759 (OLE2Link auto-activated remote loader) critical CVE related RTF_OLE2LINK_REMOTE_MONIKER_LOADER
    RTF embeds an OLE2Link object that is force-activated with \objupdate (no user interaction on open) and fetches a remote second stage — through an INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE field or the OLE object's own moniker. This is the OLE2Link auto-update attack path shared by CVE-2017-0199 (server returns an HTA/scriptlet) and CVE-2017-8759 (server returns a SOAP WSDL the .NET parser compiles). Office processes the fetched response through the same code path; the specific CVE depends on the now-unreachable server content type.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
🗂 Part of campaign: shared payload 51ef705eef 49 samples

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 221085 bytes
SHA-256: 6ab6218b988a2e5d8f4018cd67e12d9de7895f99bde0bc837600717c4b9ec341
objdata_01_off00007114.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7114 221058 bytes
SHA-256: 591e4ed018b8dd863e91ad363fcc2b30e24ab7029bcbc03d4725e94ee84c0831
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): WScript.Shell"")")
objdata_02_off000775cd.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x775CD 2632 bytes
SHA-256: 51ef705eef602ac6eb91c2063c8f50d4e54b5e051b60429031d41133bc7df645
objdata_03_off00078b70.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x78B70 12297 bytes
SHA-256: e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7