Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 14d4ee5783b6e68f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

274.5 KB Created: 2010-08-06 15:43:58 +05:30 Authoring application: PScript5.dll Version 5.2.2 (via Acrobat Distiller 5.0 (Windows))
MD5: 9c8bfc96758890a7feb833bf7b2b0c43 SHA-1: 2423ee92eca42f4fa0bb595f8ef94275ae4bd990 SHA-256: 14d4ee5783b6e68f0bb34b321914df4ab7f7a7d2209761bfa0f540bbac0a86bd
516 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action for cmd.exe, which in turn executes an embedded Windows executable payload. This payload is disguised as 'adver.pdf' but is detected as a Windows executable by ClamAV. The combination of PDF launch actions, embedded executables, and JavaScript indicates a clear attempt to exploit vulnerabilities for client execution, likely delivered via spearphishing.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9993

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\adver.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://recruitment.nic.in
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://www.iec.ch

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
adver.pdf
46d53d47c342c8cb6f90ac919f97528da30a9b17d81d052823605fb5e6b66d77		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 61 at offset 0x2885F 139264 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0062_000.js
9104d8b29fb83cb695c22557ec5d3923e87cdf8cf7ffb49dbbed4835ae823d17		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 62 at offset 0x44541 54 bytes
stream_013_off0001004a.bin
ddbb14e6add6187d2982471cfa06df528f9d77520b30aa8e52ee279994e8500a		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x1004A 44948 bytes
icc_00_off0000458d.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x458D 3144 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00020e23.bin
3dbe20f9be6acc630d4d0f20abc07f4b2cdbd0e146c8413c395de2267f7ae495		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x20E23 22064 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00022f04.bin
10e6d34ddadf9ee5332bafabbfb4ce79e884c173e55ed674bef267b9514075de		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x22F04 37932 bytes

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