Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0a27af541e70ae04…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.8 KB Created: 2020-07-09 11:16:23 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 991f70e27bbcf9c4eab0238c94b1cdc4 SHA-1: f81b35b9f143904234350548cc3d54cb79614145 SHA-256: 0a27af541e70ae048863f5fbc89d6d2621983cd19eec42b130cc9ad58e48ee3d
162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded links to external PDF files, a technique often used for SEO manipulation or to distribute malicious content. One of the embedded links points to a known malicious redirector infrastructure, suggesting a malicious intent behind the link farm. The presence of a 'download button' lure further supports a malicious workflow.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=chemistry+book+pdf+12th
    • http://files.cailenfu.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437444/rutez_wubusaxofab_kajali_zuwogor.pdf
    • http://files.dualcredit23.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873951/e3dfb.pdf
    • http://files.gsskids.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873973/korunavo.pdf
    • http://files.wanderlustlilies.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380138/7831267.pdf
    • http://files.rioxpvista.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637034/36c763c9765.pdf
    • http://files.isoandbusinessexpert.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813797/noxodak.pdf
    • http://files.nicolemillersandiego.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857193/5d76c.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://pizitotilu.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/18073155933.pdf
    • https://mutubugeg.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/dezegarase.pdf
    • https://pobizabaj.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/pozetememewilojoj.pdf
    • https://tusabudedak.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/furuwepekotivemibes.pdf
    • https://pulixaxokuk.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/69141147811.pdf
    • https://saziwiri.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/66556222387.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/67572949107.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/46552055365.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/74535711799.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/sedafasejizal.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006e38.bin
11e11a159bf7cd6938a643106f5da350df8932d5dba50e0b3c2b6b19db057945
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6E38 5232 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000800c.bin
f332a71c2a2c77368ac980f0de929c4cfcb9e0b49de99597026a31d5abacb84a
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x800C 10192 bytes