Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 062d2920951fd2d4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

35.2 KB Created: 2009-08-30 00:20:17 UTC Authoring application: AdobePS5.dll Version 5.2.2 (via Mac OS X 10.5.8 Quartz PDFContext)
MD5: f3072159aced94a2cf797d45c401b9b9 SHA-1: 1a3de3a32ffce35a7977d641b25f4de9c21cbaf7 SHA-256: 062d2920951fd2d4b2ed4467454eea138aa012d3ab5596e56e7fd6df54eb1d7a
516 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that triggers a launch action, executing cmd.exe. This command is used to export an embedded executable disguised as 'form.pdf'. The embedded executable was detected by ClamAV as Win.Trojan.Rozena. The ML classifier and multiple critical heuristics confirm the malicious nature of this PDF, indicating it's designed to deliver a secondary payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C (if exist "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents\\form.pdf" (cd "%HOMEPATH%\\My Documents"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.iec.ch

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
form.pdf
0c41e5aaa917133b2449bfc7784c0cc2fe7dbbd17c382a188be40f5e06ed10fe		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 21 at offset 0x3B9E 37888 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-131
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0022_000.js
eff4a0943aaff2d99cb5c8666337775c91d4d5f687782df94d2c5fc77becde7f		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 22 at offset 0x88D9 53 bytes
icc_00_off000002d6.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x2D6 3144 bytes

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