Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fffb00276816276b…

MALICIOUS

PDF

98.8 KB Created: 2021-06-29 11:25:21 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-08-20
MD5: 748dcaf219c91c48486223446f18cc1c SHA-1: 268f706a397378b9b510ab430087c1ef5dcca31d SHA-256: fffb00276816276b820e1f90f570837dd86efa5328cc1ce9dd05951f766ca722
296 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains an embedded script and multiple URLs, many of which point to compromised websites or link farms. The document body and heuristics indicate a lure to execute PowerShell commands, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9928

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://anaksemut.com/contents//files/lipapix.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://softwarefactory.nl/images/file/zolikavow.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.aadhar-interior.com/userfiles/file/83961792523.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://action-roofing.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d2e33f31f1efaa5bcabe95f648d0236d/subalifiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kazenergy.kz/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16084705ad931b---16635607701.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.darvidproperty.com/news/file/nabun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://puertoestereo.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/58rldn7mnlkpe6qqqihqpl0h0n/76390800606.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://polyalpan.hu/_user/file/vegipuvidupowadajilelepid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://andreagarciam.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16083c436060bf---rebamepedobimeki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aduanaldelvalle.com/userfiles/file/28247737648.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.guaitoli.eng.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b1e288b16a9---fefokogewodoxose.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.colegiometa.net/home/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607bf2fe12318---40491525257.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aguiapromocional.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a822baa0b5f---90035162563.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lostsoulsmemorialnj.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/810b97184ee3820dcb3a6383fa2b512a/natavov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.fliesen-brill.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607cba162bd5f---jobegokurewarif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aydin-elektrik.com/resimler/files/wetexugabirukokipifemije.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://navigator-nsk.ru/userfiles/file/41815567782.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kochamsushi.pl/UserFiles/file/46904240294.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fonixkoncert.hu/upload/file/78754921378.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://3dreamstudios.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/26f384b4a6551c85fd5250e97fdbf79d/gemiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://spaslask.pl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/vloo17c4v3f04tgi2m5dck9l45/70872295168.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://proff-doors.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/561f7af774ed1e25f017c61a114d71fb/kuvaliki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xn--64-mlcufjjaii0l.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6640d21880e44820238af3e3ce6b1c53/dukigijig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.julitolaschools.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a2d2f8560df---66314652522.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://anaksemut.com/In macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/3vuEKuznOb8/uplcv?utm_term=powershell+tutorial+for+beginners+pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_000185be.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x185BE 1611 bytes
SHA-256: 846d7dc1b24dd89391d5eaf15f5c16a7758b732a9f70a7bfb898e7d21dcffda8
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 7 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='Scribus'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Pumujete Zitunu</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell tutorial for beginners pdf.  Let&#39;s start learning Powershell Lessons. First, we will learn: Windows PowerShell is an object-orie</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Powershell tutorial for beginners pdf.  Let&#39;s start learning Powershell Lessons. First, we will learn: Windows PowerShell is an object-orie</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Powershell tutorial for beginners pdf</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='Scribus'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-02-16T23:06:41'
  xmp:CreatorTool='Scribus'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='933243ee-35b3-4e97-898b-9a9629fc91d6'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='39c0f329-f150-4e04-93d1-61ab3dfa314b'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off00011b9c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11B9C 11104 bytes
SHA-256: 6b07306a1233632d2d7930b7fa33f2ea9d2ebf78221089b376f910ae80f0859a
font_01_sfnt_off00013515.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13515 18376 bytes
SHA-256: ad749ed31186ec27f4d74109a079656298cf30297da9d31a4cb7123f412f3c1e
font_02_sfnt_off000165be.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x165BE 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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