RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · ffdfa8e7d36238ac

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

295.5 KB

MD5: 191f38f0ef0adca84572330b29a32034 SHA-1: 358ebb28a5a5adf4bfccc1199901a91156063101 SHA-256: ffdfa8e7d36238ac625b595ff40cc2faae7b76a5b1a85579943c4b42cd4738fe

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The file is an RTF document that uses OLE object data and auto-linking to exploit vulnerabilities. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable Editing' to bypass Office macro security settings, indicating it functions as a malware dropper. No specific scripts were extracted, but the OLE object structure suggests it's designed to execute embedded malicious content upon activation.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000096e.bin` `b240b561807f0e6cde435e845969882278be07d543032e4d59ad05576d03f10e`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x96E	40504 bytes
`objdata_01_off0000711d.bin` `56980e073a6b930841a1286ff54debfc5df19a61f23c61829915c6e086b71194`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x711D	40477 bytes
`objdata_02_off0001ba9e.bin` `3cd3b7d42e5855c90d6d11c54ef2670ed8970441480cc23f7d39ef08fa1c935b`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1BA9E	2632 bytes
`objdata_03_off0001d041.bin` `e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D041	12297 bytes

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