Sofacy — Office (OLE) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ffa010287faad2b2…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

172.5 KB
MD5: 69065313d72009e72bbffb1dd7949083 SHA-1: 3ed1df4a4b8aad06750df980f39c96df64bee95a SHA-256: ffa010287faad2b212fa5442d5719bcff5f03dcf786e2ca6f22126bdfbd5ae6e
400 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Sofacy · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking T1137.001 DLL Search Order Hijacking

The file is an OLE document with a significant amount of slack space and an embedded PE executable. Heuristics indicate the use of CreateProcess, ShellExecute, VirtualAlloc, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress APIs, suggesting the execution of the embedded payload. ClamAV detections for 'Win.Trojan.Sofacy-1' on both the container and the extracted artifact strongly indicate the Sofacy family. The document body text appears to be test data and does not provide further clues on the attack pattern.

Heuristics 9

  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Sofacy-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Trojan.Sofacy-1
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 176,640 bytes but its declared streams total only 31,351 bytes — 145,289 bytes (82%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_00016430.exe
e273d67ef8d1d325db59fc10c276a21c960abf446ba29928ba2f3896901759dc		 embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x16430 85456 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Sofacy-1
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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