Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ff745acefe64a1a0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

9.6 KB
MD5: 35c03867c350490b17b8efd59b80ec7a SHA-1: 087a4000f3c3cad395637230c1b00993b0806e86 SHA-256: ff745acefe64a1a09ad5afdc5547076cf46db40b6c6ab769feeb2cbc199c67fe
126 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 JavaScript T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF document contains embedded JavaScript, specifically leveraging the 'Collab.collectEmailInfo' method to exploit CVE-2007-5659. This technique is used to decode and execute a hex-encoded stager. The stager is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload, indicating a typical downloader pattern. The high confidence is due to the direct exploitation of a known CVE and the clear stager functionality.

Heuristics 6

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER
    PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN
    PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0007_000.js
9f17df95bc71874fe0f2dcb9f0e8f529cdb3604910d27079f2fbde52cabda2a8
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x19B 256 bytes
annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js
f83c1763fd61e1a287018f0c733421b7b8c493ebfe9d2eaead5f576624fcbd20
deobfuscated-js annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x14A 5211 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
deobfuscated.js
15ac4cb8b81f5d35573c55dfeac9188df0625b8c56257f4f1d79443c40835441
deobfuscated-js PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass 46819 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).