Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ff7070e66141e3dc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

107.0 KB Created: 1996-12-17 01:32:42 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 2b642bf1e072edaaf25cf896df283cd6 SHA-1: ee70f01e89af57f360c9dc7d9bb50de13bda55e4 SHA-256: ff7070e66141e3dc339c8e085f22c939deadaa0c67ef1be9a81ea90b8ac11524
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The OLE document exhibits anomalies in its slack space and contains an appended executable payload, indicating it's a container for malicious code. While VBA macros could not be extracted due to format issues, the presence of an appended payload strongly suggests a malware delivery mechanism. The exact nature of the payload and its execution method remain unclear without further analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 109,592 bytes but its declared streams total only 24,565 bytes — 85,027 bytes (78%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.