RTF malware analysis — malicious · ff4820c3f8858403

MALICIOUS

RTF

103.3 KB First seen: 2024-09-22

MD5: e92931ff775d4a38a80c98289bdd59a0 SHA-1: 8c1efc3e65d08b8ac3dd388e66514f331093ff95 SHA-256: ff4820c3f8858403479f88118318d5a55b5e6a2e474f7e9a1bb8268304e62f6c

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The file is an RTF document containing OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate and \objautlink heuristics indicates that the embedded OLE object is designed to be automatically activated upon opening the document. This exploit likely serves as a dropper for a secondary payload, though no specific download URL or execution script was directly extracted.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000514.bin` `cdd7f7fc9878539ec88596ce292aacb04c95045e9ad4089fbe4ba4b3d9814e80`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x514	1917 bytes

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