Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ff4317f98e3fe91f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

683.3 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 818085473e19695b7abb51508341ec4d SHA-1: 34bba21e4f21787b566712d019ce662b29b2f197 SHA-256: ff4317f98e3fe91f59a57e389fbcff25b20e92499d3b5e199a046a07e6f5a193
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that triggers CVE-2017-8759, a known vulnerability in MSXML SAX. This exploit allows for arbitrary code execution upon opening the document. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJEMB, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics further supports the exploitation of OLE objects. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide clear user-facing content, but the critical heuristics point to a malicious exploit delivery.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000a21b6.bin
1f5bb3f396909d608dcf759f5a211809351f1fa0a2a01e2d1ba739f0fa2c8f52		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA21B6 3739 bytes

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