Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ff42edf8e5699d1a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

2.21 MB
MD5: 90273e02d95923088201942dcbe6dc3e SHA-1: 7455b9d17fa3ffafa3e51daddc9abca4d3f14329 SHA-256: ff42edf8e5699d1a858d2aa4059a72ef160dbde5ddd13c44a2e66bb83e73f88c
240 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The file is an encrypted Office document that contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object. Heuristics indicate this object is anomalous and carries a payload, specifically triggering detections related to CVE-2018-0798. The ClamAV detection confirms this is malicious malware, likely an Agent. The encrypted nature and exploit carrier suggest a delivery mechanism for a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML contains embedded Equation Editor data with anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like.
  • ClamAV: Win.Malware.Agent-9826752-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Win.Malware.Agent-9826752-0
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Equation Editor object carries payload-like Ole10Native stream high OLE_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE_PAYLOAD_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object declares the Equation Editor CLSID but stores a large high-entropy Ole10Native stream with malformed package sizing. This is exploit-shaped Equation/OLE payload evidence.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.