Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ff3e16e6d69d65ef…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

39.7 KB First seen: 2023-02-18
MD5: 46b24f5953890be086d7f16a7f37283c SHA-1: e6c76e0cca31648bb8db54c7624ea993de1bb871 SHA-256: ff3e16e6d69d65ef3d9be011d02aeded9d83f6cdf0e14c76ce58a1fc0e19b2c8
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document prompts the user to enable editing, a common tactic for malware droppers. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" sections further suggests an attempt to exploit OLE object handling.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000450c.bin
d1f32ba1ae1d5ff5589b7b9eab3d1764dde0b7e9f146b02ef67c98f264c56797
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x450C 1810 bytes