Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ff1fe7760e3ab514…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.9 KB
MD5: c9ea25146bebf0a1734427938926219d SHA-1: 505acd1c82edcd0954dc382db249209e8deea648 SHA-256: ff1fe7760e3ab5149821f2c0640fb0baeefe29688bcd9f8118ed781a15428767
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor vulnerabilities. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated automatically upon opening, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability. This is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000d0.bin
6a0ae24213f76a22e166faaf821534f56581825c6ee3667b75c37eadfed53f91
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD0 2153 bytes