Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ff16c173ce4871a2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

65.5 KB Created: 2020-11-10 08:07:47 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2022-06-20
MD5: ec6c801a067fc24dccdf4218ddaa290b SHA-1: 235905edd4177de04638f326e946e2edc8d71c3e SHA-256: ff16c173ce4871a2abd6401b916e2b51bb9d3a9583749eddc1dcc13650ec8136
254 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/aws?keyword=george+foreman+evolve+grill+manual+download In PDF document text
    • https://tewubituzidebu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134359488/nidibuku-kasojisunevovim-fepiliwazagebu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nesavelo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303009/6750790.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://muwubuzegutan.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134649477/720f3ee96b0ddd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://guwomenod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873843/kedoxezezaj-temolej-zunemalavorun-mutelokowomimi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://neriborotarisim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134345051/sapediwaxunademi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/eaa10f8f-7e18-45df-b5c3-3e426ec1af6a/muxikupixuwuga.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/begijufadi/elements_of_chemical_reaction_engineering.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/535816f6-c7e2-4468-ab62-fef15935b2b9/splunk_fundamentals_2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/senodiw/columbian_knight_chess_set.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/petikamov/barney_stinson_bro_code_deutsch.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zuxadol/uk_criminal_law_textbook.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xezonijida/outcome_of_the_trial_in_to_kill_a_mockingbird.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000af6b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xAF6B 5232 bytes
SHA-256: 107ec212147b246b51670db35d23451eec2e1ead0140bf93a2c626c86b4e906a
font_01_sfnt_off0000c139.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC139 10304 bytes
SHA-256: 45b8004aab09d93db67f1a9cc21ab026b667bad697619163afbd6aabf805234f
font_02_sfnt_off0000e406.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE406 16084 bytes
SHA-256: 61ab26ef3059b09256b8547e5574ce70db9c335fe5fa9adc58a7cf2ba22ac202

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