Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ff04de070992e038…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

512.9 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: c8d6f663f18deded129dcd09717fac93 SHA-1: d9693e9110dcb432447fa12d3e5d3a5e830a4984 SHA-256: ff04de070992e03856e6f04a66c1fb8c0861c5e655eb13e8c0c1d266c73ea501
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-8759). This exploit allows for the activation of OLE objects, which is likely used to execute malicious code. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics further supports the exploitation of OLE object functionality. The primary intent appears to be the execution of a second-stage payload via the exploited vulnerability.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0007a0c4.bin
a73a8ef1f1c97d13a8f1085cb4e2914592b89f4511c27f7ab8045b06dda900f6		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7A0C4 3739 bytes

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