Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fef9eaeafecc3af9…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.8 KB
MD5: 89af24f0e1f60aeaf8f17ee6de881a8c SHA-1: dd28ad733f9df2dcd3f8fb53d8f45054c96652e3 SHA-256: fef9eaeafecc3af9103ce073f0ee746f429b44d46973f464c19720a5b42a747b
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated automatically upon opening. This exploit pattern is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The file hash is included as a primary IOC.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000eb.bin
62986c7c279ad29285cd40bc87289e135456f3b6a1e2d56008edb945f3242c79
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xEB 1600 bytes