RTF malware analysis — malicious · fee89b3c1c62558b

MALICIOUS

RTF

13.0 KB First seen: 2023-03-15

MD5: 0f08eb0a48abbd926b1028b4371c15df SHA-1: 5ad766cc0f71d03018c7da0d18280d2c571048b0 SHA-256: fee89b3c1c62558b898de922841ab097f418c12d5384cea4d5cd91537166ca22

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 Malicious File Execution T1566 Phishing

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated automatically upon opening the document, likely triggering the download and execution of a secondary malicious payload. The specific nature of the payload could not be determined due to the lack of script content.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000ef5.bin` `cf43f2d4b194183d48c6238ccdf55e013ab86d9a5663ff819d57dfdad93449d5`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xEF5	2003 bytes

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