Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fedac21b637bd0e4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

105.4 KB Created: 2021-06-18 23:10:47 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: 6a689d4dcd6aca45accf7c53830f2af9 SHA-1: 1f96b7643c6ec5df52aed6b9fa3afcff5d08641e SHA-256: fedac21b637bd0e4b1427b599421c7389f76cd0fc25fcc46b1042ce9ce948be6
216 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, many pointing to compromised CMS upload directories and IP addresses, indicating a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly suggest malicious intent. While no scripts were directly extracted, the nature of the embedded links and the PDF structure are consistent with exploitation techniques.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://langestrand.se/anvandarbilder/204/files/54464326796.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://bodwellassociates.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c33838088ae46a9749c1340077a9682f/tuterubuju.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.accidentinjuryalbuquerque.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/rvm5kqavpfbjcq80hvhecqvb1b/nevilanolejawososav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://104.156.58.56/~web2inbox/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609064fe17b31---nozobaminoxubopowisowose.pdfPDF link annotation
    • https://www.sabiamente.es/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606cc8a9f16e0---gegotojule.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.movingwithmagna.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2f9e1f74fdfb6a36578fe4119d044ce7/90582054489.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://akbmodel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608c1c2dd4805---20483193237.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://1960ihs.com/clients/e/e0/e0b58928a48036c9af8d6cfc9cffdd99/File/vililafasevarezo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sunarnuricomuisvealisverismerkezi.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ekes70i1j0ntog6ut8p27q2bl2/kenus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://acethamessecurity.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/215dc9bbe076e7d8fd195df72a0f6594/22946091918.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://amezdigital.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b2df1b273260caa251efa79555accc8a/tinimepiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://paymentsbusiness.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608c202a8f036---91624363675.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.cdscabling.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160777fb8a5b1d---90036213886.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fermuar.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ac8c6d09916---23604175784.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.chicagoalphas.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16089510f2a18b---gafepeni.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ranjitabiswas.com/userfiles/files/rivivowimoro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aawyx.com/sites/default/imageuser/file/belanejolot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ddd-iasi.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16084dd3e43075---58728424683.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/Om9ozkHLxGw/uplcv?utm_term=name+of+second+twilight+moviePDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00015d2f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15D2F 5460 bytes
SHA-256: 894ddd4ac0080c527b1c4f587410c76d3932e31166ec2ed27caba0beb6827c8c
font_01_sfnt_off00016fc7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x16FC7 12216 bytes
SHA-256: eb90925acecccb820d8b99afc7f7dcfdb77411df35eb60b5e5746e19ad12081c

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